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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES:
LEGITIMATE WEAPON SYSTEMS OR
UNLAWFUL ANGELS OF DEATH?
Michael J. Deegan*

ABSTRACT
SINCE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, the United States
has utilized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to locate, surveil and kill members of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its associated forces. Such killings have decimated the leadership of
these groups and disrupted their operations. However, there
are collateral effects from UAV killings including civilian
deaths. These deaths increase resentment and hatred toward
the US, which is channeled by terrorist groups to recruit new
members and for local support. Moreover, targeted killings
outside a combat zone have political and diplomatic consequences. This paper argues that the current uses of UAV are
legal under international and domestic law. However, it proposes amended targeting criteria, greater transparency and increased checks on the executive branch for future use of UAVs.
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES:
LEGITIMATE WEAPON SYSTEMS OR
UNLAWFUL ANGELS OF DEATH?
Michael J. Deegan*
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest
in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the
United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the
conduct of war.

--President Barack Obama1
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD)
have targeted numerous leaders of al-Qaida (AQ) and the Taliban via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred
to as “drones.”2 These deaths have caused confusion in the
ranks of AQ and the Taliban, and disruptions to their operations. Generally speaking, the targeted strikes have assisted
the United States and its allies in combating terrorist groups
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, with duty at the International & Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General; M.A., U.S. Army
War College 2013; J.D., Hofstra University School of Law 1992; B.A., University of Delaware 1989. I extend my deepest thanks to Colonel Brett Weigle
for his support and advice with writing this article, and to the editors and
staff of the Pace International Law Review for their hard work preparing the
article for publication. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily
reflect the views of the United States Army, the United States Army Reserve,
or the United States Government.
1 President Barrack H. Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech
(December 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Global-News/2009/1210/text-of-barack-obamas-nobel-peace-prizeacceptance-speech/(page)/4.).
2 Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) refer to aircraft that fly without
onboard pilots along with ground control stations, networks and personnel
needed to operate these aircraft. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) refer to
the unmanned aircraft in these systems, which are often referred to as drones
in the media. BART ELIAS CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42718PILOTLESS DRONES:
BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS REGARDING UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 1 n.1 (2012) (2012.
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overseas.3 UAVs are unique weapon systems. They can fly virtually undetectable by the human eye, thousands of feet in the
air, the ground below for more than a day, and once finding its
target, bring a laser guided missile onto its mark, all without
4
exposing the pilot to harm.
However, the UAV program is not without criticism from
both inside and outside the United States (US). Collateral effects include civilian deaths from the strikes on the intended
targets.5 In addition, there are political effects that appear to
counter security gains from targeted UAV strikes. The leaders
of many partner-nations face criticism from their citizenry for
allowing the strikes to occur on their territory. Foreign diplomats and international scholars complain that the strikes violate the sovereignty of countries that are outside a combat zone
when the strikes are conducted without the affected country’s
consent. Even with these criticisms, this application of national
power by the United States government is consonant with both
domestic and international law.
This paper will argue that Congressional authorizations,
the U.S. Constitution, international law, and the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) provide the legal justification for this method
of employing lethal force in the manner it is currently conducted. It will recommend amended targeting criteria, and suggest
US judicial review prior to the conduct of future drone strikes
against suspected terrorists who are US citizens, and other reporting requirements to address some of the negative effects.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In 2009, the Obama Administration requested DoD not use the term
“Global War on Terror” as termed by the preceding administration, and requested instead the term, “Overseas Contingency Operation” (OCO). Scott
Wilson and Al Kamen, “Global War on Terror is Given New Name,”
WASHINGTON
POST,
March
25,
2009,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR200903
2402818.html.
4 Predator RQ-1/ MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper UAV, United States of America,
AIRFORCE-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/
predator-uav/ (last visited December 8, 2013). See also JEREMIAH GERTLER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136 U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 1, 33 (2012).
5 Michael J. Boyle, The Cost and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89 INT’L
AFFAIRS 1,5 (2013) (noting that all government data on death counts are classified).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, CAPABILITIES AND CRITICISMS
A. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
The use of unmanned aircraft is not a new concept for the
US military. Almost from the beginning of flight, the military
has tried to use unmanned aircraft as a weapons system. During World War I, the Navy attempted to develop a flying
bomb.6 The Navy endeavored again during World War II by
loading a B-24 Liberator with bombs for pilotless flight.7 In the
1950s, the military used unmanned aircraft as targets for new
8
pilots and as decoys in combat. During Vietnam and in the
Balkans, the US employed unmanned aircraft for intelligence
9
gathering. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001 (911), the American military used UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq
for reconnaissance, surveillance, and later, combat strikes.10
Today’s UAVs range in size from those the size of a typical
remote controlled hobby airplane of less than ten pounds, to
11
the size and weight of a large business jet. The smaller models are employed by troops in theater. For instance, the RQ-14
Dragon Eye is a small UAV that is carried in a backpack. Once
deployed, the Dragon Eye can travel as far as 2.5 nautical
miles from its operator.12 The larger models, such as the MQ-9
Reaper, have satellite communications that provide for beyond
13
Thus, the “pilots” of the larger UAV
line-of-sight operations.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
ELIAS, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.; Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 2013, at 2,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,21351322,00.html (“The program was an utter failure, and it claimed the life of Joseph Kennedy, older brother of the future President, when his B-24 blew up
prematurely.”).
8 ELIAS, supra note 2, at 1.
9 Id.; see also Lev Grossman, Drone Home, Time Magazine, Feb. 11, 2013,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2135132-2,00.html;
JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136 US UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS 4.
10 ELIAS, supra note 2, at 1.
11Jeremiah Gertler, Cong. Research Serv., R42136 US Unmanned Aerial
Systems 36; see also UAS: Dragon, Aerovironment Inc.,http://www.avinc.com/
uas/small_uas/dragon_eye/.
12 Jeremiah Gertler, Cong. Research Serv., R42136 US Unmanned Aerial
Systems, 44.
13 MQ-9 Reaper Predator B Unmanned Aircraft System UAS Drone,
6
7
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can operate and fly the aircraft thousands of miles from the actual location of the UAV.14
American journalist Lev Grossman describes UAV as
“omniscient surveillance, surgical precision, zero risk.”15 UAVs
also contain multiple systems. One system provides instantaneous up-to-date intelligence, surveillance and reconnais16
sance.
Another system allows for a weapon system that is a
relatively inexpensive strike option.17 The use of UAV enhances the United States National Strategy for Counterterrorism: to
bring targeted force on Al-Qaeda (AQ) to disrupt, dismantle
and eventually defeat AQ, and its affiliates and adherents, in
order to ensure the security of US citizens and interests.18 The
UAV is similar in nature to a precision guided munition or
“smart bomb” fired from a manned fighter jet. However, the
UAV operator has the ability to identify a target and surveil
the individual virtually undetected, with little to no risk to its
operator, and with the added benefit of keeping troops out of
harm’s way.19

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

ARMY RECOGNITION http://www.armyrecognition.com/united_states_military_
equipment_uk/mq9_reaper_predator_b_unmanned_aircraft_system_uas_
data_sheet_specifications_information_pictures_u.html (last visited Feb 12,
2014).
14 Denise Chow, Drone Wars: Pilots Reveal Debilitating Stress Beyond
SCIENCE
(Nov.
5,
2013),
Virtual
Battlefield,
LIVE
http://www.livescience.com/40959-military-drone-war-psychology.html (last
visited Dec. 22, 2013). However, a pilot at the airfield controls take-off and
landing of large UAV using a joystick.
15 GERTLER, supra note 9, at 2.
16 GERTLER, supra note 12, at 1, 9.
17 Ashley Boyle, The US and its UAVs: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, American
Security Project, AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT (July 24, 2012),
http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-costbenefit-analysis/ (last visited Dec.27, 2012); but see GERTLER, supra note 12,
at 10, who reports some UAVs, such as the Global Hawk, cost more than similar manned aircraft.
18 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 2
(2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_
strategy.pdf.
19 Grossman, supra note 15, at 2.
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B. Effects of UAV Strikes
1. Killing AQ and Taliban leadership
The employment of UAV is an effective tool in countering
violent extremism. UAV targeting has disrupted AQ and its affiliates, resulting in the deaths of 50 high-ranking AQ and Taliban leaders. .20 President Obama has hailed his administration’s success in depleting the ranks of senior AQ leaders and
making the U.S. safer.21 This “thinning” of AQ leadership is
22
due in large part to the use of UAVs. Surveillance and intelligence from UAVs were used for the successful 2011 raid by
Navy SEALs on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan that
led to his death.23 In fact, bin Laden papers found in his compound revealed that bin Laden languished the impact of UAV
strikes and advised AQ leaders flee parts of Pakistan for safer
areas.24
High value targets that were killed via UAVs include Abdel Rehman al-Hussainan, the reported second in command of
AQ who was killed in December 2012 in Pakistan.25 He allegedly had replaced Abu Yahya al-Libi, who was killed by a UAV
attack in the same area of Pakistan in June 2012.26 A top AQ
operative and US citizen was killed in September 2011 in Yem!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Grossman, supra note 9, at 2.
Michael D. Shear & Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo Backing Drone
Attacks on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/02/07/us/politics/obama-orders-release-of-drone-memos-tolawmakers.html?_r=0.
22 Bob Orr, Drone Strike in Pakistan Targets al Qaeda Leader, CBS
NEWS, June 5, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/drone-strike-in-pakistantargets-al-qaeda-leader/.
23 Greg Miller, CIA Flew Stealth Drones into Pakistan to Monitor Bin
Laden House, WASH. POST, May 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/cia-flew-stealth-drones-into-pakistan-to-monitor-binladen-house/2011/05/13/AF5dW55G_story.html.
24 Peter Bergen, Bin Laden’s Final Days – Big Plans, Deep Fears, CNN,
March 19, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/16/opinion/bergen-bin-ladenfinal-writings/ (last visited May 6, 2014).
25 Ismail Khan, U.S. Drone Strike Kills a Commander for Al Qaeda in
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/
world/asia/us-drone-strike-kills-a-senior-al-qaeda-commander.html.
Hussainan was also known as Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti.
26 Id.
See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t
Dodge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013.
20
21
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en when a UAV targeted Anwar al-Awlaki.27 Further, AQ’s
chief scientist and master bomb-maker, Abu Khabab al-Masri,
was a casualty of a UAV sortie in Pakistan in 2008.28
2. Civilian Deaths
The UAV strike that killed Hussainan also wounded
Hussainan’ s daughter and wife (who later died from her
29
wounds).
This is but one example of the collateral damage
from UAV targeting. Former CIA Director and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has argued that UAVs are “remarkably precise and limited in terms of collateral damage”.30 However,
other sources indicate a much larger footprint. The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism, a nonprofit news organization in
Great Britain, “estimates the number of persons killed in drone
attacks at 3,000 to 4,500 including well over 200 children.”31
They estimate that civilian deaths as a percentage of total casualties from UAV attacks range between 18 to 26 percent in
Pakistan, 16 percent in Yemen and between 7 to 33.5 percent
in Somalia.32
Another group cites lower, but still significant civilian casualties. The New America Foundation reports that from June
2004 to October 2012 there were 334 UAV strikes in Pakistan.33 These attacks were responsible for between 1,886 and
3,191 deaths with an average of 7.4 to 9.6 persons killed per
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt
Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” N.Y. Times, Sep. 30, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-iskilled-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all ( Awlaki was termed “the leader of external operations for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” The strike also
killed Samir Khan, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent who was an editor of
an AQ English online magazine. One of the published articles was “Make a
Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom”.
28 Brian Michael Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade, Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory?, RAND CORP. (2012) available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP362.html.
29 Khan, supra note 25.
30 Boyle, supra note 5, at 3.
31 Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge. N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/the-questionsbrennan-cant-dodge.html?_r=0.
32 Boyle, supra note 5, at 6.
33 Id. at 5.
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strike.34 The group labels 85 percent of those killed as “militants” from the period of 2004 to 2012.35 This is a dramatic decrease in civilian casualties as compared to previous years..
Based on the group’s figures, from 2004 to 2007, noncombatant
deaths in Pakistan comprised more than 50 percent of the UAV
strikes.36 By 2011, civilian fatalities had dropped to 1 percent
of all UAV assaults in Pakistan.37 The low percentages continued into 2012.38 The lower rate of civilian casualties are believed to be the result of greater scrutiny by the Obama Administration prior to approval of a strike involving the potential for
civilian casualties. Smaller munitions used for a smaller blast
radius prolonged the dwell-time over the objective; and resulted in less strikes.39
For numerous reasons the data on civilian deaths are
mere estimates. First, the attacks usually occur in remote and
sometimes uncontrolled territories where a formal constabulary is not established.40 Second, relatives of the casualties
remove the bodies from the area and quickly bury them in accordance with Muslim law preventing identification and the
number of individuals killed.41 Third, AQ and the Taliban exaggerate the number of civilians killed for propaganda and recruitment purposes.42 Lastly, the US classifies details of UAV
strikes thereby precluding dissemination of this information. 43
Due to the number of civilians killed and the public outcry of alleged indiscriminate killings by UAVs, a United Nations panel convened in 2013 to investigate whether unlawful
killings had occurred. The investigation is centered on 25 recent UAV strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Peter Bergen, Civilian Casualties Plummet in Drone Strikes, CNN
(July 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/13/opinion/bergencivilian-casualties.
39 Id.
40 Boyle, supra note 5, at 6.
41 Id.
42 Id. Boyle also indicates that United States officials underestimate the
number of civilian casualties from UAV strikes.
43 Id.
34
35

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7

8

7. MICHAEL DEEGAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

256

PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION

11/24/14 10:56 PM

[Vol. 26::2

and the Palestinian territories.44 The panel is also investigating the alleged “double-tap” UAV attacks, which killed individuals who were attending funerals of those who died in an earlier strike, and spectators visiting the bomb scene.45 An
interim report was issued in September 2013.46 The Special
Rapporteur found 33 UAV strikes that caused civilian casualties, but did not render an opinion as to whether any deaths violated international law.47 The September report calls for
greater transparency by States who utilize UAVs that involve
lethal targeting.48 A subsequent report was issued in March
2014. Key findings disclosed a reduction in UAV strikes in
2013 in Pakistan, but increased strikes in Afghanistan and
Yemen.49
Per the report, civilian casualties had increased
three-fold in 2013 in Afghanistan compared to 2012, accounting
for 45 deaths and 14 non-fatal injuries.50 The Special Rapporteur reiterated a previous conclusion that States have an obligation following a UAV strike that results in civilian casualties
to “conduct a prompt, independent and impartial fact-finding
inquiry and to provide a detailed public explanation of the results.”51
3. Deaths Used for Recruitment and anti-American Sentiment
In addition to the number of civilians killed, each death
“represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and
more recruits for [whatever] militant movement” can tap into
that hatred.52 Visceral feelings are not limited to the affected
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 John F. Burns, U.N. Panel to Investigate Rise in Drone Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/world/europe/unpanel-to-investigate-rise-in-drone-strikes.html?_r=0.
45 Id.
46 G.A. Res. 66/171, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013).
47 G.A. Res. 66/171, supra note 46, ¶ 21.
48G.A. Res. 66/171, supra note 46, ¶ 45.
49 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/59, March 11, 2014, ¶¶
25-26, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/119/49/PDF/
G1411949.pdf?OpenElement.
50 Id. at 6, para. 25.
51 Id. at 8-9, para. 32.
52 David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death from Above, Outrage Down Below, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
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area, but extend to the greater population in the targeted region. As the local population sees it, when their government
cannot protect them from UAV strikes by the US, they become
antagonistic toward their government, resulting in a weakened
State.53 This environment is perfect for terrorist safe havens:
the local populace feels disenfranchised from the government
thereby decreasing the stability of the affected State.54 Moreover, the hatred is easy to channel by terrorists despite the fact
that the terrorists and the angry population may hold different
political or religious philosophies.55 Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee in April
2013, testified that UAV strikes are now “the face of America.”56 He emphasized his point by stating, “What violent militants had previously failed to achieve, one drone strike
achieved in an instant.”57
4. Potential for Decreased Support from Allies
One UAV attack in Pakistan in 2011, which allegedly
killed 40 civilians when the US confused a tribal meeting for an
assemblage of terrorists, has prompted a lawsuit by the survivors’ families against the British government.58 The plaintiffs
in that suit allege that British officials are liable for the deaths
that occurred because they gave intelligence to Americans who
used the information for subsequent UAV strikes, including the
one that killed the plaintiffs’ family members.59 Judges have
yet to decide whether to hear the case, but it may create a
chilling effect on US allies who pass intelligence to the US.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?pagewanted=all.
53 See Boyle, supra note 5, at 3.
54 See id. at 18. See also Kilcullen & Exum, supra note 49.
55 See Thousands rally in Pakistan against US drone attacks, HURRIYET
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/thousands
-rally-in-pakistan-against-us-drone attacks.aspx?PageID=238&NID=
58810&NewsCatID=356.
56 Charlie Savage, Drone Strikes Turn Allies into Enemies Yemeni Says,
N.Y. TIMES) (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/
world/middleeast/judiciary-panel-hears-testimony-on-use-of-drones.html
57 Id.
58 Ravi Somaiya, Drone Strike Prompts Suit, Raising Fears for U.S. AlTIMES,
(Jan.
30,
2013),
available
at
lies,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/world/drone-strike-lawsuit-raises
-concerns-on-intelligence-sharing.html.
59 Id.
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The British are the United States’ greatest allies in countering
violent extremism.60 Other nations, such as Germany and the
Netherlands, also supply intelligence to the US, and may cut
intelligence sharing for fear of similar lawsuits.61 Any decrease
in the flow of intelligence will curtail America’s goal to disrupt,
dismantle and defeat AQ and its affiliates. 62
Criticism also concerns UAV strikes that occur in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, nations outside the borders of Afghanistan. Critics argue that attacks in countries outside a
war zone and without the consent of the affected government
violate the country’s sovereignty and are possibly acts of war.63
The Obama Administration dismisses these arguments since
AQ and its affiliates are “transnational, non-State actors where
the principal theater of operations is not in a country in conflict
with America.”64 Thus, boundaries are irrelevant, similar to
the global war zone of World War II. While most Americans
support UAV strikes overseas to target terrorists,65 many,
however, would not support UAV assaults within the US.66
C. UAV Operations over American Territory
The U.S. Attorney General has stated that UAV targeting
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Louis Charbonneau, U.S. drone Strikes Violate Pakistan’s Sovereignty:
U.N., REUTERS, (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/
us-un-drones-idUSBRE92E0Y320130315.
64 O’Connell, supra note 26.
65 John Sides, Most Americans Approve of Foreign Drone Strikes,
POST,
(Mar.
10,
2013),
available
at
WASHINGTON
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/10/mostamericans-approve-of-foreign-drone-strikes/. This article cites a Pew Center
poll, which conducted a random survey of Americans. They were asked
whether they supported “the United States conducting missile strikes from
pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia?” The results were that 56 percent approved of the
strikes, 26 percent disapproved and 18 percent were undecided. See also Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Isolationist Streak in Americans, N.Y. TIMES
(May 1, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/
american-public-opposes-action-in-syria-and-north-korea.html (also citing a
New York Times/CBS News poll demonstrating that 70 percent of those
polled favor the use of UAV to carry out attacks against terrorists overseas).
66 See Thee-Brenan, supra note 62.
60
61
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in the U.S. is a possibility in an “extraordinary circumstance”
to prevent an attack similar to Pearl Harbor or 9-11.67 This is
not as remote of a possibility as one would think. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012 “requires the FAA to begin integrating unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system by the end of fiscal year
2015.”68 The FAA currently consents to the use of unmanned
aircraft by public entities such as law enforcement on an individual basis. However, requests for such use have increased
dramatically in recent years.69 Few Americans support UAV
targeting in the U.S. against a suspected terrorist, regardless
of whether the suspected terrorist is a U.S. citizen or not.70 Only 25 percent support UAV airstrikes in the US against suspected foreign terrorist living in the U.S., and the support is
even less for UAV targeting of US citizens living in the U.S.
who are suspected terrorists (13%).71
One rationale for the low support is that most Americans
perceive UAVs as an instrument of the military or CIA, not of
law enforcement. Americans have long-standing suspicions
against using the military in a law enforcement capacity (e.g.,
the Posse Comitatus Act).72 However, the weapon system on a
UAV is just like any other lethal weapon used by the police. In
that light, the inquiry should revolve around the imminence of
the danger, and the lack of a less violent alternative. Current
law dictates that lethal force against a criminal suspect is permissible when the police officer has probable cause to fear for
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Terry Frieden, Holder Does Not Rule Out Drone Strike Scenario in
U.S., CNN (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/05/politics/obamadrones-cia.
68 Elias, supra note 2, at Summary.
69 Id. at 5.
70 Alyssa Brown and Frank Newport, In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists Abroad, GALLUP POLITICS,(Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/161474/support-drone-attacks-terroristsabroad.aspx.
71 Id.
72 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Posse Comitatus Act was a compromise to end
Reconstruction and was due to southerners’ abhorrence of federal troops serving in law enforcement capacities after the Civil War. The Act prevents using
federal troops to enforce laws generally carried out by police. See Sydney J.
Freedberg, Jr., Posse Comitatus: Tiny Law, Big Impact, NAT’L J. Nov.12,
2005, at 3557.
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his or her life, or the lives of others.73 Therefore, the question
should center on whether there is probable cause or an imminent threat that precludes apprehension.
Another possible concern regarding the use of UAV within
the U.S. is the belief in the right to privacy, and the fear that
America will become akin to George Orwell’s novel Nineteen
Eighty-four in which the government is engaged in omnipresent surveillance.74 Because of these apprehensions, legislators
in Florida, Virginia and Idaho passed laws that prevent UAV
observation by law enforcement at public gatherings.75 There
are likewise more than 30 proposed laws under consideration
across the US that are similar to the laws already in effect.76
The current laws do not preclude the police from using UAVs to
locate a fleeing suspect or in an emergency.77
These concerns raise the issue of a foreign nation conducting strikes against its own list of alleged terrorists on American
soil. Has the U.S. set a precedent for strikes within the borders
of a foreign nation, without the consent of that nation, based on
a declared war on a group or groups within that nation’s populace? The only known States that have armed UAV capabilities are Israel, Great Britain and possibly Italy.78 Several other nations are known to be seeking them: France, Germany,
Turkey, India, Russia, Taiwan, China, Iran, South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.79
Hezbollah has launched a crude, Iranian-made UAV, that carries an eighty-eight pound armament, which is activated when
the UAV slams into its mark (Israel has intercepted several of
these sorties).80 Based on current data, it is unlikely that most
States or non-State actors will have a long-range, armed UAV
within ten years to threaten the U.S. security interests or those
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
See generally George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).
75 Maggie Clark, After Boston, Police Use of Drones Debated, POLITICO,
May 6, 2013.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Micah Zenko, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT NO. 65 (2013).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 21.
73
74
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on U.S. soil.81 Lack of capability, however, does not equate to
lack of weighing an option. Nevertheless, this paper will show
that the US has set the precedent for other States to lawfully
conduct UAV strikes within the US.
The rules for targeting remain classified by both the US
DoD and the CIA.82 There is no congressional or judicial oversight - the Justice Department asserts dominion remains solely
in the executive branch of government.83 Thus, any legal analyses that justify the killings are not released to the public or
any other government agency outside the executive branch.
The lack of disclosure invites the criticism that UAV killings
are indiscriminate and not in conformity with US or international law.84
Sections II, III and IV of this paper will use three concepts to affirm a legal basis for the use of UAV strikes outside a
war zone.
II. TARGETING UNDER JUS AD BELLUM
A. Customary International Law, the United Nations Charter
and Self-Defense
When one State can use force against another is guided by
the principles of jus ad bellum or the “right to wage war.”85
This concept requires a State to only resort to force in limited
circumstances, which are codified in the United Nations Char!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id. at 20-21.
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Op-Ed., The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/thequestions-brennan-cant-dodge.html. Critics have accused President Obama
of hypocrisy for keeping the legal opinions that justify UAV targeting secret,
noting that shortly after his inauguration he ordered the public release of
classified memos governing CIA interrogations under President George W.
Bush. See also Michael Shear & Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo, N.Y.
Times Feb. 6, 2013.
83 O’Connell, supra note 79.
84 Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 11, 2013. Critics also charge the US has engaged in “signature strikes” aimed at anyone “whose
behavior conforms to suspicious patterns,” not just high-level AQ members.
85 Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan, the
Law of War and the Legality of the Drone Attacks, J. INT'L BUS. & L. 1, 2
(2011).
81
82
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ter and customary international law (CIL).86 Those limited circumstances include self-defense, or when a state has authorization from the United Nations Security Council.87
The United Nations (UN) Charter attempts to restrict
States from using force against another State or “against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State”.88
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that “All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state …”89 These restrictions are in accordance with the
central theme of the UN Charter: States should respect each
other’s internal affairs and national sovereignty.90
As mentioned above, there are instances where a State
may justifiably use force against another State or within a
State’s borders. The first is where a State can claim their actions were in self-defense, and the second is when the force is
authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter.91 The use of force in self-defense is based on
CIL, which was codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security....”92
There are two types of self-defense: individual and collective.93 Individual self-defense is generally thought to include a
State’s right to protect its territorial integrity, its political independence and the protection of its citizens and their property
abroad.94 Collective self-defense is the right of a State to re!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id. at, 4.
U.N. Charter art. 51,
88 U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
89 Id.
90 U.N. Charter art. 2.
91 Id.; see also U.N. Charter, art. 39. “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
92 U.N. Charter art. 51.
93 Id.
94 Richard DiMeglio, et al., Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook 35 ( The
86
87
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ceive support from or join with another State to react to an attack or fend off an attack.95 Prior to a Security Council authorization, the Council will examine the act of aggression and
make a determination concerning how the international peace
and security can be restored.96
B. Authorizations under United Nations Security Council
Resolutions and Operation Enduring Freedom
The UN Security Council implicitly recognized the right of
a State to take action in self-defense following a terrorist attack in Security Council Resolution 1368 (SCR 1368).97 This
occurred following AQ’s attack on the US on 9-11.98 The resolution “unequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the
horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September
2001 … and regard[ed] such acts, like any act of international
terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security …”99
The Security Council reiterated its position in SCR 1373 less
than three weeks after 9-11, affirming “the need to combat by
all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts …”100 The resolution also recognized a duty of each
State to not ignore terrorist activities within its borders stating, “every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory
directed towards the commission of such acts …”101 In line
with the sentiments of SCRs 1368 and 1373, the U.S. invaded
Afghanistan and attacked both AQ and the then-government of
Afghanistan, the Taliban, on October 7, 2011. The operation
was termed Enduring Freedom (OEF).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army 2012),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2012.pdf.
95 Id. at 36.
96 U.N. Charter art. 42.
97 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c4e94557.html.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 S.C. Red. 1373, U.N. Doc. 1373, S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), available
at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/un/6135.htm
101 Id.
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The US and its allied forces involved in OEF used the
basis of self-defense as the justification for the use of force to
invade Afghanistan. The US Ambassador to the United Nations at the time, John Negroponte, notified the Security Council of the invasion and cited self-defense as its justification:
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that the
United States of America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001…102

The international community recognized the right of the
US to use force against AQ and the Taliban, even though responding to terrorist attacks was historically a matter for law
enforcement. International entities such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the European Union and the Organization of American States joined in condemning the attacks and
recognized the right of the US to defend itself.103 Even unlikely
advocates, such as China and Russia, endorsed OEF.104 Thus,
UAV strikes remain necessary to decimate AQ leadership and
keep their training and subversive efforts thwarted. No other
known means are as effective as UAV strikes for these purposes.105
1. Proportionality
The other test under jus ad bellum is proportionality,
which limits the force to what is necessary to circumvent the
threat.106 However, proportionality does not require an eye for
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Letter of John Negroponte to the President of the Security Council,
AVALON.LAW.YALE.EDU, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/un_006.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
103 Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under
the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2008).
104 Id.
105 Daniel L. Byman, Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s
Weapon of Choice, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, July/August 2013,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-dronesobama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman#.
106 Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism, at 16.
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an eye or parity between the terrorist attack and the State’s response.107 Critics argue that UAV strikes are no longer proportional to the attacks on 9-11 given the architects of 9-11 were
killed or captured. This is likewise a narrow, “tit for tat” analysis. AQ still seeks weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict on the West’s nuclear capabilities are not the only WMD
that AQ seeks. Toxins such as ricin, anthrax and botulinum
toxin “appear in several AQ post-September 11 terrorist
plots.”108 The employment of UAVs have curtailed these pursuits. Al Qaeda’s WMD program was impeded in 2008 when
AQ’s “chief scientist and master bomb-maker,” Abu Khabab alMasri was killed by a UAV operation in Pakistan.109 Thus, in
this instance the proportionality test was met because the killing by UAV greatly outweighed the mass destruction that could
have occurred if al-Masri and AQ continued in their pursuit of
WMDs.
D. Anticipatory Self-Defense
Another criticism of the UAV program is the force used by
the US is no longer grounded in self-defense. The U.S. subscribes to the theory of anticipatory self-defense.110 Under this
concept, the U.S. is not required to wait for an attack before it
can defend itself. Instead, it may repel an imminent attack before it occurs.111 This analysis is logical. As stated by Professor
Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University, “[i]t [is] absurd to require that the defending State should sustain and absorb a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id.
Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade, at 3.
109 Id.
110 The concept is not new. In 1914, former Senator and Secretary of
State, Elihu Root, stated “Every sovereign state [has the right] to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect
itself.” Michael Gerson, “Obama’s Drone Policy, Rooted in Self-Defense,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2013.
111 Some in the international community advocate the very narrow view
that a State may only use force following an armed attack and then only after
the Security Council takes effective action per United Nations Charter, Article 51. U.N. Charter art. 51. In their view, the Charter eliminated the concept of anticipatory self-defense, and the right of a State to act independently
of the Security Council. The United States takes the opposite opinion, contending that the inherent right of self-defense was not expunged by the UN
Charter.
107
108
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devastating (perhaps a fatal) blow, only to prove the immaculate conception of self-defence.”112 Anticipatory self-defense
makes sense, especially in response to terrorism. Since terrorist groups do not have the resources to match arms with the
target State, they must rely on surprise to exert the greatest
effects. Thus, catching a State unaware is the objective. As articulated by President George W. Bush in his 2002 National
Security Strategy (NSS):
[Terrorists] rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of
weapons of mass destruction - weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning …To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States will, if necessary, act preemptively.113

This position was reinforced four years later in President
Bush’s 2006 NSS:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s adversaries … The greater the threat,
the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the
case for taking action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.114

The Obama Administration has likewise taken the position
that UAV strikes are justified under an anticipatory selfdefense basis.115 The key to anticipatory self-defense is that the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence, 191 (Cambridge,
4th ed., 2005). cited by Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, NAVAL L. REV. 23,
64 (2008).
113 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 15.
114 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), 18.
115 Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Speech to Northwestern University School of Law, (March 5, 2012) available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html
(“Given these facts, the Constitution does not require the President to delay
action until some theoretical end-stage of planning – when the precise time,
place, and manner of an attack become clear. Such a requirement would create an unacceptably high risk that our efforts would fail, and that Americans
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action is made to forego an imminent armed attack.
Critics of the America’s interpretation of anticipatory
self-defense assail it as preventative, and thus illegal under international law.116 They argue that the window of opportunity
to prevent a terrorist attack is generally so small and obscure
to render anticipatory self-defense unavailing.117 Professor Michael Schmitt of the US Naval War College advocates a twopronged test before anticipatory self-defense is employed
against non-State terrorists.118 First, the State must identify a
group with intent to execute an attack against the State. Second, the group must make significant advancement toward obtaining the manner to execute an attack. Therefore, the test
involves intent to attack by a group and an overt act towards
carrying out the attack. This test is reasonable and should assure the international community that States are not acting
indiscriminately when targeting non-State actors.
E. State Sovereignty
However, even if Professor Schmitt’s test is satisfied, does
that allow one State to violate the sovereignty of a second State
in order to launch an attack against a non-State actor operating within the borders of that second State? Sovereignty is the
right of a State to be free from outside meddling and incursion.
As mentioned earlier, it is a fundamental right in CIL and articulated in the UN Charter.119 Critics of the UAV program
contend that the US does not have the right to violate another
State’s sovereignty, outside of a combat zone, even if there is a
legitimate target and other jus ad bellum criteria are met (E.g.,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
would be killed.”).
116 Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the Scope of Self Defense in International Law, ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol.
17: Iss. 1, Article 8 available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/
annlsurvey/vol17/iss1/8.
117 Sean D. Murphy,The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 Vill. L.
Rev. 699 (2005).
118 Schmitt, supra note 112, at 65.
119 “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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necessity and proportionality).120
Nevertheless, sovereignty should not take precedence
over self-defense. Outside the recent combat zones of Iraq and
Afghanistan, the US has engaged in UAV strikes primarily in
Pakistan, but also in Yemen and Somalia.121 Some of these
strikes were undertaken with the consent of the “host” nation,
while others were not.122 It is lawful for another State to conduct counter-terrorist operations with the consent of the host
State.123 For example, in cooperation with Yemeni officials, the
US administered a UAV strike in 2012 on a group intending to
attack Yemeni troops.124 Nine people were killed including
Nader al-Shaddadi, a leader of the local branch of AQ.125 The
issue is less clear, however, when no explicit consent is given
by the host State.
Many times, the US does not obtain the express consent
of the host State prior to UAV strikes, only tacit consent. Political reasons or internal instability may prevent a host State
from giving express consent. For instance, Pakistan’s refusal
to give express consent after notification from the U.S. of its intent to conduct UAV strikes could serve the competing designs
of maintaining good relations with the U.S., while dissociating
Pakistan from UAV operations, which are abhorred by its citizens.126 In an April 2012 speech, White House counterterrorism advisor (now CIA Director), John Brennan, said the Obama
Administration concluded there is no law barring the U.S. from
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, at 19.
O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge.
122 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, & Evan Perez, U.S. Unease Over
Drone Strikes, WALL ST. J., September 26, 2012.
123 Schmitt, supra note 112, at 67; but see, O’Connell, Unlawful Killing
with Combat Drones, at 16. Professor O’Connell asserts that it is unlawful to
use drone outside of a combat zone even if the State consents to the strike
within the State’s borders.
124 Nasser Arrabyee, Qaeda Leader Reported Dead in Yemen Attack, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/world/middleeast/
yemen-drone-strike-al-qaeda.html.
125 Id.
126 Entous, et al., supra note 129 (“Approximately once a month, the CIA
sends a fax to Pakistani intelligence outlining broad areas where the US intends to conduct UAV strikes. The Pakistanis do not respond.” Although the
Pakistanis do not formally reply, they clear airspace for the UAV and do not
interfere with the aircraft in any way. The US takes these actions and omissions as tacit consent.).
120
121
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using lethal force outside of a combat zone, “provided the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action
against the threat.”127 One month before, Attorney General Eric Holder articulated this same doctrine known as “unwilling or
unable.”128
F. The “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine
The unwilling or unable doctrine is grounded in the philosophy that a State “cannot be deprived of its right to defend itself, but at the same time must allow the host State a reasonable opportunity to remedy the matters before suffering a nonconsensual violation of its territory.”129 Aside from responding
to requests from another State to infringe on a host State’s territory, all States are responsible to maintain order in their domain, making certain their territory is not utilized to the impairment of another State’s security.130 The Taliban did not do
this, instead allowing AQ to establish training camps and plot
terrorist activities including those involving 9-11 within its
borders.131 The U.S. gave warning to the Taliban prior to
launching OEF, demanding that they turn over bin Laden and
those who planned the terrorist attack.132 The Taliban refused,133 and their regime was toppled shortly thereafter.134
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Id. This doctrine is also articulated by Professor Dinstein cited by
Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism, at 21-22.
128 Attorney Gen., Eric Holder, Speech to Northwestern University Sch.
of Law (Mar. 5, 2012).
129 Schmitt, supra note 112, at 70.
130 Id. 23-24 (Citing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of Corfu
Channel in which it held that every State had an obligation to not knowingly
allow its territory be used for acts contrary to the rights of others). But see
the ICJ cases of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), 2005, I.C.J. 25 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/116/10521.pdf,
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5; U.N.
Secretary-General, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.16 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1497.pdf.
131 Schmitt, supra note 136, at 22.
132 John F. Burns WITH Christopher S. Wren, Without Evidence, the Taliban Refuses to Turn Over bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/international/21CND-PAK.html.
133 Id.
134 Jayshree Bajoria AND Zachary Laub, The Taliban in Afghanistan,
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Security Council Resolution 1373 also recognizes the duty
of a State to refrain from instigating, assisting or acquiescing
in organized terrorist activities within its borders: “[E]very
State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts.…”135 Thus, there are actions which could make the host State complicit in the activities of a terrorist organization acting within its borders, allowing the offended State to act in self-defense against the host
State (e.g., the Taliban in Afghanistan).
It is possible that the host State is unaware of the actions
within its borders, or which actions the victim State wishes to
take or have taken within the host State. Thus, the victim
State must make a demand on the host State to fix the complained wrong, and give the host State a reasonable time to
comply.136 The failure of the government of the host State to do
so because it is unwilling or unable provides the victim State
the right to intervene within the host State’s borders. The intervention must be restricted to addressing the hazard within
the host State as expeditiously and precisely as possible.137
G. Summary Analysis under Jus ad Bellum
The United States use of UAVs is compliant with the principles of Jus ad Bellum. Under this concept, a State is justified
in using force in self-defense. The UN Security Council recognized such a right following the terrorist attack of 9-11 in various resolutions in 2001. America asserted the right of selfdefense to invade Afghanistan, and allies and UN Member
States endorsed the actions of the U.S. Although more than a
decade has passed since the invasion of Afghanistan, the threat
of violent extremism from AQ and its associated forces still ex!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551 (last visited Feb
12, 2014).
135 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1373, S/RES/1377,
September 28, 2001, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm
(accessed 4/2/13). The resolution goes into much detail on the acts or omissions that are considered unlawful actions by States in relation to the prevention of terrorist activities.
136 Schmitt, supra note 136, at 27.
137 Schmitt, supra note 136.
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ists today. Given such, America’s invocation of anticipatory
self-defense is necessary to forego a future attack. Outside of a
combat zone, UAV strikes are lawful when the U.S. obtains the
consent of the State where the attack will occur, or when the
State is unwilling or unable to confront the threat.
III. TARGETING UNDER JUS IN BELLO
A. Introduction to Jus in Bello
The previous analysis under jus ad bellum took into account when force is permissible. Similarly, the rules on the type
or means of military force are guided by the principles of jus in
bello (law of war).138 Jus in bello is primarily codified in the
Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and CIL, and is
guided by the principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity.139 These principles explicitly define
what and who may be targeted and how such targeting may occur.
B. Military Necessity
Military necessity is the means necessary to obtain military objectives. Military objectives are “those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization … offers a definite military advantage.”140 Only military targets are lawful objects for direct
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 It is DoD policy to ensure compliance with the law of war regardless of
level of armed conflict or how the conflict is characterized. U.S. Department
of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Program, Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May
9, 2006), paragraph 4.1. However, some scholars argue that the LOAC does
not apply to AQ or its associated forces since they do not meet the legal
standards, such as wearing uniforms or following the customs of warfare. See
Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of
War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2009), http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2013/03/Sitaraman-Ganesh.CT-GWOT-and-the-LOAC.2009.2.pdf.
139 This analysis is separate and distinct from the jus ad bellum analysis
of necessity and proportionality described above in Section II.C.
140 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60
(Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 2013) E-2.
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attack.141 CIL makes a distinction between combatants and
noncombatants (usually – but not always – civilians). Combatants, and those participating in hostilities that have demonstrated a hostile intent or performed a hostile act, may be targeted.142 Civilians cannot be targeted nor can other people who
are hors de combat or “outside the fight.”143 Persons that fit
this definition include prisoners of war, medical personnel engaged in medical duties, and combatants who are wounded and
who cease to fight.144
Civilian status is presumed until there is evidence to the
contrary.145 Given that AQ members do not wear distinctive
insignia or uniforms that separate them from civilians, a State
is required to conduct an analysis prior to a UAV strike to ensure the person is a proper military target. This author proposes the following test prior to UAV targeting: (1) that the potential target is a member of AQ or its affiliate organizations;
(2) that the target has taken or is currently engaged in actions
against the US that have caused or could cause death or physical injury to US citizens or significant destruction of US property; (3) the target continues to participate in the activities of
AQ or its affiliate organizations; and (4) the target has not re!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Trevor A. Keck, Not all Civilians are Created Equal: The Principles of
Distinction, the Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities and Evolving
Restraints on the Use of Force in Warfare, 211 MIL. L. REV. 115 (2012).
142 Id.
143 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 50, 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, [hereinafter Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention]. However, civilians can lose their protection “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” See, Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Convention, Id. at article 51(3).
144 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment to Prisoners of War and
Medical Personnel art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 24, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC II].
145 AP I, article 50(1). Some have referred to terrorists as “unlawful combatants”, “irregular forces” or “unprivileged enemy belligerents” since they do
not fall into the definition of “combatants” as conceived in the Geneva Conventions. Other scholars argue that AQ are enemy combatants that Congress
has authorized the use of force against. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (This essay concludes that AQ and its associated
forces are enemy combatants in which LOAC applies).
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nounced his membership and prior actions.146
Using the example of an improvised explosive device (IED),
there are numerous people involved in the execution of said device. There is the logistics person who obtains the “ingredients”: for instance, a cell phone, gunpowder, wiring, fuses, projectiles and a container.
He or she may deliver these
components to the maker or assembler of the IED. A cell leader may select a location for emplacement of the IED. One or
more persons may place the IED in the ground, a car or other
undetectable place. There may be spotters who signal a triggerman to detonate the IED to ensure maximum casualties in
the target area. Thus, one IED attack may involve as many as
six or more persons who have taken a direct part in the terrorist act. Each of them could be targeted by a UAV. While there
may be policy and/or strategic reasons to the contrary, each of
these participants is a proper military target under jus in bello.147
C. Distinction
In addition to military necessity, distinction is the principle of jus in bello that ensures that only proper parties are targeted. For example, it is unlawful to target civilians or medical
personnel engaged in medical duties.148 Critics of UAV strikes
have alleged that vast numbers of civilians are killed along
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
This proposed test is similar to the loss of protections for citizens
found in AP I, article 51(3). However, it does not contain the limitation of
targeting only for the limited time that the civilian is engaged in direct part
of hostilities. The test is similarly distinguishable from the “continuous combat function” articulated in the INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 996 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC DPH Guidance].
147 Some scholars argue that the only legitimate targets are those who directly participate in terrorist activities. They further assert that the direct
participants can only be targeted when they are engaged as a combatant.
Thus, under this thinking the farmer by day and fighter by night can only be
targeted at night. See Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 19, Addendum (May 28, 2010). See also ICRC
DPH Guidance, 66-68. (This author does not subscribe to this opinion as it
would unjustly favor the terrorist over the State, with potential cataclysmic
ramifications to the State).
148 See supra note 150, at articles 50, 51; see also GC I, article 24.
146

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7

26

7. MICHAEL DEEGAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

274

PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION

11/24/14 10:56 PM

[Vol. 26::2

with targeted terrorists.149 Civilian deaths are always a tragedy but sometimes unavoidable when a terrorist is targeted. AQ
leaders are known to use protected persons (e.g., civilians) and
places (e.g., religious, charitable or cultural property) as cover
to avoid attacks.150
A UAV can potentially discriminate more precisely between legitimate and protected targets than traditional
manned aircraft or other weapon systems. For instance, the
UAV MQ-9 Reaper can soar at 50,000 feet for 32 hours to survey an area two-and-a-half miles wide from 12 simultaneous
angles; this persistence ensures that an AQ member is targeted to minimize the killing of civilians and the destruction of civilian property.151 An imaging system called ARGUS included
in some UAVs can detect an item as small as six inches from an
altitude of 20,000 feet to ensure that an AQ member is properly
identified.152
Fatigue is less a concern with UAV than manned aircraft
given UAV operators can take shifts while the UAV remains
airborne. The operator of a UAV does not have to fear being
shot down while waiting for the opportune time to strike.
Thus, the UAV controller can focus on ensuring a precise, laser-guided strike on a target. Finally, a strike from a UAV can
be pinpoint and produce less collateral damage than an assault
by a Special Forces team into a hostile area.
D. Proportionality
The next consideration in the jus in bello analysis is proportionality, which ensures that the benefits from targeting
outweigh the damages or collateral effects from the targeting.153 There is a balancing test between the military advantage and the civilian damage/loss of life.154 Thus, it may be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case
Study of Pakistan, 21 (2012).
150 Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 118 (2011).
151 JEREMIAH GERTLER, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS, R42136, 35
(2012); see also Grossman, “Drone Home,” supra note 15.
152 See supra note 15.
153 Vogel, supra note 150, at 124.
154 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention, supra note 143, at art.
51(5)(b); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,
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unlawful to strike a bazaar where an AQ leader is shopping if
numerous civilians may be killed or wounded in the process.
The question hinges upon a judgment that the civilian deaths
or property damage is, or is not, excessive in relation to the
military advantage that would be achieved by the strike. Suppose the target is an elusive terrorist who rarely presents himself in public and has directed numerous terrorist attacks in
the past. Therefore, proportionality may not restrict the attack
given the military advantage to be gained by this target’s
death. In the final analysis, leaders must take all precautions
necessary to minimize the loss of life and property damage if
available.
E. Humanity
The last component of the jus in bello analysis is humanity. This principle attempts to minimize suffering.155 For instance, it is unlawful to place broken glass in a mortar or grenade which will make it difficult to treat an injured combatant
since the glass is not detectable by x-ray.156 A commander
must evaluate if there is a more prudent way to target a person.157 In the context of UAV, there is no need to capture a terrorist if it would expose friendly forces to unnecessary risk or
suffering, or threaten security arrangements between nations
by putting American forces on the ground in another State.158
Moreover, there may be policy reasons that constrain the sending of US forces into a country, with or without the host State’s
consent. From a strategic standpoint, one could argue that the
assault in Abbottabad, Pakistan by Navy SEALs to kill Bin
Laden caused greater condemnation from the Pakistani government than many UAV strikes in that country.159 This is
probably the sentiment that “boots on the ground” is a greater
infringement on a State’s sovereignty than a UAV that flies
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

FIELD MANUAL 27-10 5 (1956).
155 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 23(e), (Oct. 18, 1907) 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
156 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, supra note 161, at § 34.b.
157 Vogel, supra note 150, at 127-128.
158 Michael J. Boyle, The Cost and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89
INT’L AFFAIRS 12 (2013).
159 Jane Perlez and David Rohde, Pakistan Pushes Back Against U.S.
Criticism on Bin Laden, N.Y TIMES, May 3, 2011.
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thousands of feet above the ground and launches an attack silently from the sky.
The armaments found on UAV are lawful weapons.
However, any lawful weapon has the potential for improper
use. Combatants who fire mortars without regard for where
the projectiles will land have used a lawful weapon in an unlawful manner. This is not to say that every strike by UAV is
lawful. There is not a mandate for a State to anticipate all potential wrongful applications of a lawful weapon system since
all weapons are capable of use in an unlawful manner.160 UAV
can employ the same missiles as those carried by manned aircraft. The UAV MQ-1 Predator is armed with two AGM-114
Hellfire missiles, while the MQ-9 Reaper carries up to sixteen
Hellfire missiles.161 The Army’s Apache helicopter carries the
same number of Hellfire missiles as the Reaper, but nobody
has suggested that the Apache is an unlawful weapon system.
162 What makes the UAV unique is its operation by personnel,
who are at times thousands of miles from the scene of the
strike. Regardless of its mysterious nature, the UAV is still a
lawful weapons system.
F. Summary Analysis under Jus in Bello
America’s uses of UAVs pass the necessary criteria of jus
in bello when the target is evaluated for military necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity. Under military necessity, only military objectives can be targeted. Terrorists are
lawful objects to attack. Identifying these targets is challenging given AQ members do not wear distinctive insignia or uniforms. Given the ability of UAVs to hover over an area for
hours at a time and sophisticated imaging systems, they have
the ability to discriminate between legitimate and protected
targets. Like other weapons systems, commanders must perform a proportionality analysis that weighs the collateral effects from targeting terrorists. The weapons on UAVs are lawful weapon system, and are the same as used on piloted
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law
of War, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687 (2012).
161 Gertler, supra note 156, at 35.
162 Id.
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aircraft. In the final analysis, a UAV is a lawful weapon system, as long as UAVs are utilized with a focus on minimizing
human suffering.
IV. TARGETING UNDER DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Department of Justice White Paper
Any decision to employ force must rest upon the existence
of a legal basis in international law from the dual perspectives
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.163 Another prerequisite is the
domestic law of a State.164 The Obama Administration justified
the targeting of American citizens via UAV in a 2012 memorandum published by the Department of Justice titled “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citizen
who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associate
Force.”165 This unclassified, undated White Paper (with no
listed author) was obtained by the press during the Senate confirmation hearings for John Brennan to be Director of the CIA.
Much of the analysis in the White Paper is applicable to targeted persons irrespective of US citizenship.
The sixteen-page memo details the elements that the
Obama Administration deems necessary prior to the targeting
of a U.S. citizen.166 First, the targeted individual must present
an imminent threat of violent attack against the U.S.167 Second, the U.S. citizen must have joined AQ or its associated
forces and is a senior operational leader.168 Third, capture
must be infeasible.169 Lastly, the operation , must be conducted
in accordance with the previously discussed LOAC (and its
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Richard DiMeglio, supra note 94, at 8.
Larson, supra note 82, at 2.
165 “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citizen
who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associate Force,” [hereinafter White Paper]. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/
020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (accessed 4/10/13). There appears to be a
classified version of the White Paper that was not publicly released but was
shown to members of two Congressional Committees; see O’Connell, supra
note 26.
166 Id.
167 White Paper, at 1.
168 Id. at 2.
169 Id. at 6.
163
164

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/7

30

7. MICHAEL DEEGAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

278

PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION

11/24/14 10:56 PM

[Vol. 26::2

components of necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity).170 The legal determinations are not new; they closely
reflect those given by Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. in a
speech he gave at Northwestern University School of Law on
March 5, 2012.171 Let us examine five assertions within the
White Paper: 1) Authorization for Use of Military Force; 2) Associated Forces as Targets; 3) Imminence of the Threat; 4) Capture of Suspect Infeasible; and 5) No Mandatory Judicial Review.172
B. Authorization for the Use of Military Force
The White Paper’s primary argument for justification of
targeting a U.S. citizen, who has joined AQ or its associated
forces, is the President’s alleged constitutional responsibility to
protect the U.S. and its citizens.173 The document also bases
the right to target U.S. citizens who are senior leaders of AQ
under the self-defense justification in both CIL and Article 51
of the U.N. Charter. The White Paper further cites Public Law
107-40, Authorization For Use of Military Force in Response to
the 9/11 Attacks, (AUMF).174 This legislation authorizes the
President to use military force against only those international
terrorists and other parties directly involved in aiding or materially supporting the 9-11 attacks.175 The relevant portion of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170

Id. at 1.

Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Speech to
Northwestern University School of Law, (March 5, 2012) available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech171

1203051.html.
172 White Paper.
173 Although no specific responsibility is prescribed in the Constitution, it
is believed the author meant that this “responsibility” is derived by analogy
from the President being the commander in chief of the Army and Navy and
his responsibility to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
US.” See generally U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1-2; President Obama also references
this responsibility in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism: “The most
solemn responsibility of the President and the United States Government is
to protect the American people, both at home and abroad…” Barak Obama,
President of the U.S., National Strategy for Counterterrorism 1, 8 (June 28,
2011).
174 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE, PL 107–40,
September 18, 2001, 115 Stat 224. [hereinafter AUMF].
175 The AUMF satisfied the authorization required under the War Powers Act. See AUMF at §2(b)(1).
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the law reads:
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION
STATES ARMED FORCES.

FOR

USE

OF

UNITED

(a) IN GENERAL. — That the President is authorized to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.176

C. Associated Forces
Note that the AUMF only gives the President authorization to take military action against those nations, organizations
or persons he has determined to have planned, authorized,
committed or aided the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Congress did not
give the President a blanket authorization to use force against
all terrorist organizations.177 It is clear that AQ and the Taliban fall under the authorized entities encompassed by the
AUMF based on AQ’s planning and execution of the 9-11 attacks and the Taliban’s harboring of AQ. This Congressional
authorization is far-reaching as applied to AQ and the Taliban.
It not only authorizes targeting members of AQ and the Taliban who had a part in the 9-11 attacks, but members who
played no part in the attacks, and also converts who became a
part of AQ or the Taliban after 9-11.178 The White Paper also
asserts the ability to target both AQ and its associated forces.179
These associated forces can be targeted under the authority of the AUMF if they have a direct connection to AQ.180
The associated forces with connections to AQ may be dwindling
after twelve years of war. AQ was a vertical organization with
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
AUMF, supra note 174.
Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL22357, Authorization
For Use Of Military Force in
Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History 3 (2007).
178 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005)
179 White Paper, at 1.
180 Richard DiMeglio, supra note 177, at 3.
176
177
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a central command structure at the time of 9-11.181 Since then,
AQ has been described by John Rollins, specialist in Terrorism
and National Security for the Congressional Research Service,
as:
… composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized leadership
structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the
leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to
a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief
Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no
longer exists. Out of necessity, due to pressures from the security
community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse
global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence.182

Thus, AQ is more fractured and decentralized today than
at any time since the 9-11 attacks. This puts a greater burden
on the present Administration to ensure the targeted person is
a member of an organization actually connected to AQ. Another noteworthy point in the AUMF is that there is no expiration
date for the authorization for the use of force. However, Congress could pass a law that revokes this authority at any time.
Finally, there is no restriction as to the geographic confines of
the authorization: the strike does not necessarily need to occur
in a declared combat zone.
D. Imminence of the Threat
The White Paper sets as a condition that the targeted individual must constitute an imminent threat of a violent attack
against the U.S.183 The paper promulgates a unique definition
of “imminent” that “does not require clear evidence of a specific
attack on US persons and interests in the immediate future.”184
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 John Rollins, Cong. Research Serv., RS41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates:
Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy
(Jan. 25, 2011).
182 Id.
183 White Paper, at 1.
184 Id. at 7.
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Thus, imminence is inferred as long as the targeted U.S. citizen
has recently been involved in activities posing a threat of violent attack, and there is no evidence suggesting that the person
has renounced or abandoned such activities. From the author
of the White Paper’s perspective, senior leaders of AQ are continually planning attacks and prior activity implies intent for
future attacks.185 Thus, imminence is always present or continuous as long as there is no renunciation from the targeted person.
Critics argue that the memo “redefines the word imminence in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning.”186 It is unclear why the administration put this stipulation into the White Paper, since there is no requirement under
jus in bello that a lawful target be an imminent threat. It is
possible that it was included to reinforce the grounds for the
strike in the first place: self-defense generally and anticipatory
self-defense more specifically. Recall that anticipatory selfdefense justifies using force in anticipation of an “imminent”
armed attack.187
E. Capture of the Terrorist Infeasible
The White Paper determines that capture is infeasible
when the attempt would pose an undue risk to U.S. personnel
involved in an operation or if the host State did not consent to
the capture within their borders.188 If capture is not feasible,
then the U.S. citizen could be targeted by UAV. There may be
policy or strategic considerations to capture a member of AQ or
its associated forces instead of targeting them; however, under
CIL there is no requirement to capture the target if it would
threaten the lives of friendly forces.189 The only requirement
under the humanity analysis of jus in bello is to reduce the de!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Id. at 8.
Jameel Jaffer, “The Justice Department’s White Paper on Targeted
Killing,” ACLU Blog of Rights, February 4, 2013, http://www.aclu.org/blog/
national-security/justice-departments-white-paper-targeted-killing (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
187 Murphy, supra note 117, at 3.
188 White Paper, at 8.
189 Keck, supra note 141, at 171-172.
185
186
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gree of suffering caused by a particular weapon system.190
F. Judicial Review Not Required
The White Paper argues that judicial oversight is not required and is in fact inappropriate regarding the targeting of a
U.S. citizen.191 The administration argues that it is well established that matters relating to foreign policy or national security are not the province of the courts, since they involve matters
of discretion assigned by the Constitution to the executive
branch.192 This may be technically accurate; however, the absence of a legal requirement in our current system does not
make such targeting a correct policy decision.
Congress could create an appropriate judicial forum to review the justification for targeting a U.S. citizen and rule on
this action. While perhaps not legally required, it is logical under basic due process for certain checks on executive branch
power to be in place prior to the taking of a U.S. citizen’s life.
The American legal system gives more rights to a U.S. citizen
prior to police searching his or her home than when they are
marked for a drone strike; the former action requires a courtissued search warrant.193
The present Administration should introduce legislation to
Congress that would create a special court to review the analysis and evidence from the executive branch that indicates a
U.S. citizen meets all criteria under domestic and international
law prior to targeting.194 This special court would be empowered to authorize or decline the government’s request for that
U.S. citizen to be added to the targeted list. If time would not
permit bringing the evidence before the court, the legislation
must include other safeguards such as post-targeting reporting
to the court and/or select committees or subcommittees of Congress. A similar reporting system to Congress should be in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
190 See supra note 143. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention at
article 51(5)(b).
191 White Paper at 10.
192 Id.
193 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
194 Editorial Comment, A Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. Times (Feb.
13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-isneeded-to-review-targeted-killings.html.
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place for targeted AQ members who are not U.S. citizens.
Without such legal protections, the United States government
will continue to be accused of violating LOAC and infringing on
the sovereignty of other States.
G. Summary Analysis of Targeting under Domestic Law
In sum, the AUMF empowers the executive branch to take
military action against AQ and the Taliban. The White Paper
cites the authority from the AUMF, amongst other claimed authorities. In addition, the White Paper claims authority to not
only target AQ and Taliban senior leaders, but also members of
its “associated forces.” As a condition for targeting, the White
Paper notes the target must constitute an imminent threat of a
violent attack against the US. The author of the White Paper
takes a broad definition of “imminence” in regards to the
threat to the U.S., indicating that imminence is inferred as
long as the targeted person has recently been involved in activities posing a threat of violent attack, without any evidence of
renunciation. The White Paper also determines that capture is
infeasible if the attempt would pose an undue risk to U.S.
troops involved in an operation or if the host State did not consent to the capture within its borders. Finally, the White Paper argues that judicial oversight of UAV targeting is not required since it is a matter of foreign policy or national security,
which is reserved to the executive branch.
V. CONCLUSION
Administrations since 9-11 have wielded power in the form
of unmanned aircraft flying thousands of feet above their targets. The concept of lethality without exposing a pilot to harm
was attempted virtually from the advent of flight. During
OEF, those capabilities were realized and honed to find and
target Taliban, AQ and associated fighters in Somalia, Yemen,
Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper has argued that,
within certain parameters, the U.S. can legitimately target terrorists under the AUMF outside a combat zone as long as the
government conducts proper analysis prior to such targeting.
This use of force is permitted in self-defense under both customary international law and the United Nations Charter.
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The UAV targeting has reduced the ranks of leadership
and the decentralization of AQ and its affiliates. “Eliminating
AQ’s leadership is an effective way of disrupting its command
and control and reducing its operational capabilities, but these
killings will not end AQ’s terrorist crusade” unless they are
properly integrated into the U.S. National Counterterrorism
Strategy.195 In fact, secondary effects from targeting (civilian
deaths) increase the size of the recruiting pool for AQ. These
consequences can perpetuate the very conflict the UAV program seeks to eliminate.
This is not to say that the UAV program does not have its
place as a permissible weapon system in the commander’s arsenal. There is a time and place for UAV targeting, especially
in the “shadowy and secretive world of transnational terrorism.”196 The judicious use of this weapon alongside other elements of national power will comprehensively combat AQ and
its ruthless ideology.
When President Obama was elected in 2008, he wanted to
restore the United States’ reputation in the international community as a good neighbor following the failure of American
forces to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the controversial interrogation practices that followed the invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan.197 His administration’s current practice
of targeted killings using UAVs potentially damages that restoration campaign. A clearly articulated process with appropriate
checks and balances is essential for domestic support at home
and tolerated acceptance abroad of the UAV program. An appropriate judicial forum to review and approve targeted killings of U.S. citizens abroad will assist in adding transparency
and legitimacy to a criticized secret program. Additionally,
disclosures to Congress concerning non-citizens will ensure
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Jenkins, supra note 28, at 15.
Per Professor Schmitt, “In the shadowy and secretive world of transnational terrorism, that window can close long before a terrorist strike takes
place. Stated bluntly, when the opportunity presents itself, it may be necessary, and lawful, to kill a terrorist that you cannot capture, even though you
do not know precisely when and where he or she will strike.” Schmitt, supra
note 112, at 66.
197 Barack H. Obama, Democratic National Convention Acceptance
Speech, Aug. 28, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/
us/politics/28text-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
195
196
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that the administration is conducting the proper legal analysis
before targeting a suspected terrorist.
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